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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
NORMA LOIS COOPER, 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
vs 
FORESTERS UNDER-
WRITERS, INC., 
a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S 
BRIEF 
No. 8105 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an action on an insurance policy issued 
by Appellant to Respondent on March 31, 1951, 
which provides for certain medical, surgical and 
hospital benefits described in the Policy (See Ex-
hibit attached to Amended Complaint, Record 3 to 
6). This case was submitted to the Court on a 
written Stipulation of facts, which is as follows: 
1. That Plaintiff submitted her application 
for insurance coverage and paid her first 
month's premium and application fee thereon 
to Moses Leese, Agent of Defendant, at approx-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
imately 9:00 p.m. on the 31st day of March, 
1951. 
2. That Plaintiff's application for insurance 
was accepted by Defendant and Certificate No. 
A-145 was issued to Plaintiff pursuant to the 
application mentioned above. 
3. That on May 7, June 18, July 17, Aug-
ust 27, and October 1, all in 1951, Plaintiff paid 
premiums of Six ($6.00) Dollars each to De-
fendant on said insurance policy. 
4. That the premium payment on October 
1, 1951, was made in the afternoon of that date. 
5. That on October 31, 1951, in the after-
noon, Plaintiff was injured in a fall at the Culli-
gan Soft Water Service Company store, Salt 
Lake City, Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
6. That in the evening of October 31, 1951., 
after the accident occurred, the Plaintiff paid 
the sum of Twelve and no/100 ($12.00) Dollars, 
to Moses Leese, an Agent of the Defendant. 
7. That as a result of her fall and injuries 
Paintiff was hospitalized and expended more 
than Five Hundred ($500.00) Dollars formed-
ical, surgical and hospital services. 
8. That Plaintiff made timely demand upon 
the Defendant for payment of insurance bene-
fl. ts under her policy of insurance, but Defen-
dant denied and still denies liability thereunder 
and has refused to pay. 
9. That Defendant is now and at all times 
herein mentioned has been qualified in the State 
of Utah as a fraternal benefit society. 
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10. That at the time of the accident com-
plained of by the Plaintiff, certain by-laws and 
regulations had been duly adopted by Defen-
dant and were in full force and effect, which 
read in part as follows: 
"LAPSATION 
"1. A member enrolling for membership, 
regardless of the time of day that the appli-
cation is made, his coverage shall start as of 
the time payment is received but shall be 
dated as of 12 :00 o'clock noon the day pre-
mium is received and for said premiums re-
ceived his coverage would continue in force 
for one month from that date and in addi-
tion would have a 31-day grace period at 
which time, if no other premiums were re-
ceived, his membership would terminate at 
12 :00 o'clock noon of the 31st day of grace. 
If a member shall have lapsed it is considered 
that he must pay all back premiums in order 
to reinstate and the due date shall remain 
the same as originally stated in his member-
ship certificate and he will be penalized not 
only the payment of back premiums but his 
coverage shall become effective for accident 
only from the time reinstatement premium 
was received and all other coverage shall com-
mence 10 days thereafter. All coverage shall 
begin and end at 12:00 o'clock noon, stand-
ard time, at the residence of the insured. 
Where lapsation has been in excess of three 
months and reinstatement is desired the above 
can be accomplished or new application must 
be made with a 90-day waiting period being 
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in effect for all coverage except accident which 
would be in immediate benefit from the time 
premium was received." 
"GENERAL PROVISIONS 
"4. If default be made in the payment of 
the agreed premium for this certificate, the 
subsequent acceptance of a premium by the 
organization or by any duly authorized agents 
shall reinstate the certificate, but only to 
cover accidental injury thereafter sustained 
and such sickness as may begin more than 
ten ( 10) days after the date of such accep-
tance." 
11. That the Amended Answer of Defen-
dant may be considered as an Answer to the 
Amended Complaint of Plaintiff. (Record 10, 
11 and 12.) 
Based upon the foregoing the trial Court en-
tered judgment in favor of Respondent (Record 15), 
from which this appeal has been taken. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I 
THE POLICY HAD LAPSED AT THE TIME 
OF THE ACCIDENT. 
II 
THE GRACE PERIOD EXPIRE AT NOON 
ON OCTOBER 31, 1951. 
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III 
CONCLUSION OF LAW NO.1 IS NOT SUP-
PORTED BY THE FINDINGS OF FACT. 
IV 
ARGUMENT 
Point No. III will not be argued separately, but 
is included in the discussion under Points No. I 
and II. 
I 
THE POLICY HAD LAPSED AT THE TIME 
OF THE ACCIDENT. 
The policy contains the following proVISions 
(See Exhibit attached to Amended Complaint): 
"This Certificate is dated and takes effect 
March 31, 1951, in consideration of the state-
ments and agreements made by the insured in 
the application and the payment in advance of 
$6.00 as the first premium, which maintains 
this Certificate in force for one month from 
its effective date. The payment in advance and 
acceptance by the Company of premiums month-
ly of $6.00 thereafter is required to keep this 
Certificate in continuous effect. The Company's 
acceptance of the premiums will constitute its 
consent for renewal. All periods of insurance 
hereunder shall begin and end at twelve o'clock 
noon, standard time, at the residence of the in-
sured. 
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"SECTION V. GRACE PERIOD. A grace 
period of thirty-one ( 31) days will be allowed 
for payment of any renewal premium during 
which grace period the Certificate will remain 
in full force." 
"SECTION VII. (3) No statement made 
by the applicant for insurance not included here-
in shall void the certificate or be used in any 
legal proceeding hereunder. No agent has auth-
ority to change this Certificate or to waive any 
of its provisions. No change in this Certificate 
shall be valid unless approved by an executive 
officer of the organization and such approval 
be endorsed hereon." 
" ( 4) If default be made in the payment of 
the agreed premium for this Certificate, the sub-
sequent acceptance of a premium by the Organi-
zation or by any of its duly authorized agents 
shall reinstate the Certificate, but only to cover 
accidental injury thereafter sustained and such 
sickness as may begin more than ten days after 
the date of such acceptance." 
The policy provides for monthly "periods of 
insurance" which begin and end at noon on the last 
day of each month, commencing March 31, 1951, 
and required the payment of a monthly premium 
of $6.00 to keep the "certificate in continuous effect." 
The first premium paid the policy to April 30, 1951, 
at noon, and the premiums paid during the months 
of May, June, July and August paid the policy to 
noon of the last day of each of those months. The 
payment made on October 1st was made on the last 
day of the grace period and paid the policy to noon 
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of September 30, 1951. The last "period of insur-
ance" was from noon September 30th to noon Octo-
ber 31st. October having 31 days, the grace period 
corresponded with the "period of insurance" and 
evpired on October 31, 1951. The premium for this 
"period of insurance" was not paid during the grace 
period, therefore the policy had lapsed at the time 
the accident occurred in the afternoon of October 
31, 1951. The payment made in the evening of 
October 31st does not alter the result for the reason 
that Section VII ( 4) of the policy provides for rein-
statement "only to cover accidental injury thereafter 
sustained." 
II 
THE GRACE PERIOD EXPIRED ~T NOON 
ON OCTOBER 31, 1951. 
The trial Court apparently took the position 
that the law does not recognize fractions of days 
and that the grace period ran until midnight October 
31, 1951. That the law does not take cognizance of 
fractions of days as a general rule is recognized. 
We are also a ware of Section 68-3-7 of the Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, which provides as follows: 
"68-3-7. TIME, HOW COMPUTED.-The 
time in which any act provided by law is to be 
done is computed by excluding the first day and 
including the last, unless the last is a holiday, 
and then it also is excluded." 
But the rule adopted by the trial court is a mere 
legal fiction and subject to limitations as stated in 
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52 American Jurisprudence, Pages 340 and 341, as 
follows: 
"The general rule that the law knows no frac-
tions of a day is a mere legal fiction, and, like 
all other legal fictions, is allowed to operate only 
in cases where it will promote right and justice. 
"And although the ends of justice never re-
quire that the law depart from the ordinary 
rule and recognize a fraction of a day to defeat 
the manifest intention of the parties, where 
the parties to a contract stipulate for the per-
formance of the contract by an agreed hour on 
a certain day, the law in such case will take 
cognizance of the fractions of the day." 
Perhaps the most common exception to the above 
general rule in the field of insurance is found in 
cases where the policy expires at a certain time of 
day, such as in Mutual Benefit Health and Accident, 
vs. Kennedy, 140 Fed. 2d 24, where the policy ex-
pired at noon on a certain day and it was held that 
where the insured drowned two hours thereafter 
there was no coverage. The same proposition is 
found in Shankle, vs. Home Insurance Company of 
New York, 133 S. W. 2d 289 (Tenn.) where the 
policy provided for coverage from December 5, 
1936, to December 5, 1937, at Noon Standard Time, 
place of issue, and it was held that an accident which 
occurred at 7:30 p.m. on December 5, 1937, was 
not covered. The Court in the Shankle case observed 
that the principle that the law knows no part of 
a day has no application to a contract having a 
definite hour for its expiration. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11 
The Certificate provides "all periods of insur-
ance hereunder shall begin and end at Twelve o'clock 
Noon, Standard Time, at the residence of the in-
sured." Thus, not only the hour of beginning, but 
also the hour of ending of each "period of insurance" 
is specifically set forth. There is no ambiguity in 
the wording of the provisions. Likewise, the case at 
bar should be distinguished from one where the 
policy provides for a definite hour of commencement 
on a certain day, but fails to specify a definite hour 
of termination. The question for decision is whether 
the time specified in the policy as to the beginning 
and ending of the "period of insurance" applies to 
the grace period, the grace period not having such 
a specification. The wording of the grace provision 
is: 
"A grace period of thirty-one (31) days will 
be allowed . . . " 
The trial court apparently held that the grace 
period expired at midnight on October 31, 1951. 
This does violence to the policy in that it allows 317i 
days of grace instead of 31 as provided for therein. 
The interpretation of Appellant is the only one con-
sistent with the terms of the policy. 
There are a number of cases which have speci-
fically held that the grace period, renewal period, 
etc., although not specifically limited as to hour, are 
limited by the other provisions of the policy. In 
the case of Richardson, vs. American National In-
surance Company, 137 S. 370 (La.) the following 
are the pertinent provisions of the policy: 
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"In consideration of the ... payment in 
advance of a policy fee of Two Dollars and a 
premium of $1.95 does hereby insure Thomas 
Richardson, subject to all the conditions herein 
contained and endorsed hereon, from 12:00 
o'clock noon, standard time, of the day this 
contract is dated, until 12:00 o'clock noon, 
standard time, of the 15th day of February, 
1925, and for such further periods, stated in 
the renewal receipts, as the payment of the pre-
mium specified in said application will main-
tain this policy and insurance in force, against 
death or disability ... " 
" ( 2) A period of five ( 5) days of grace is 
allowed for the payment of any renewal pre-
mium, during which the policy shall be main-
tained in full force and effect in accordance 
with its terms, but if the payment of any re-
newal premium is made after the grace period 
of the policy has expired neither the Insured 
nor the Beneficiary shall be entitled to recover 
for any accidental injury sustained between the 
date of such expiration and 12 :00 o'clock noon, 
standard time, of the day following the date 
of such renewal payment; or for any illness or-
iginating or death occurring before the expira-
tion of ten ( 10) days after the date of such 
renewal payment. 
"(3) If default be made in the payment of 
the agreed premium for this policy, the subse-
quent acceptance of a premium by the Company 
or by any of its duly authorized agents shall re-
instate the Policy, but only to cover accidental 
injury thereafter sustaip.ed and such sickness 
as may begin more than ten days after the date 
of such acceptance." 
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The pre1nium due at noon on February 15, 1929, 
was not paid until February 22, 1929. The insured 
was fatally shot on February 20, 1929, at 4 :45 p.m. 
It was contended that inasmuch as the grace period 
provision was not limited to noon that the insured 
had until six p.m., or sunset of the last day to pay 
the premium in accordance with a provision of the 
Louisiana law. The Court held that the grace period 
expired at noon of the last day. The language of 
the Court is as follows : 
"We conclude that, under both the common law 
and the codal article, contracting parties have 
the right to stipulate for the performance of 
the contract by an agreed hour on a certain day 
and the law in such case will take cognizance 
of the fractions of the day. 
"The argument of plaintiff's attorney is predi-
cated upon only a few words of the clauses in 
question, which he attempts to isolate from the 
language of the balance of the clause and the 
other clauses in the policy. To accept this inter-
pretation would be to give the plaintiff not only 
five days grace, but five days, four hours, and 
forty-five minutes. We do not believe that this 
was contemplated by the parties and that the 
language in question must be interpreted in con-
nection with the remainder of the clause and 
also the other provisions of the policy, which, 
as a whole, show that the policy commenced and 
ended at 12 o'clock noon, whether it was ter-
minated upon the expiration of the term or upon 
the termination of a renewal period, or upon 
the termination of the grace period. All of the 
periods of time in the policy are based upon 12 
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o'clock noon. We find no uncertainty or am-
biguity or conjecture in the language of the 
policy on this point." 
Orlando, vs. Rosen, 290 N. Y. S. 270. This case 
involved a workmen's compensation policy which 
was written to expire on November 11, 1934, at 
12 :01 a.m. By a rider attached, the policy was ex-
tended for a period of one month to expire on De-
cember 11, 1934. The rider contains the following 
provision: "Subject otherwise to all terms, limita-
tions and conditions of the policy to which this en-
dorsement is attached." The claimant was injured 
at two p.m. on December 11, 1934. It was held that 
the policy had expired some hours earlier that day. 
Purvis, vs. Commercial Casualty Co., 159 S. E. 
369 (S.C.) (1931). The defendant insured Jack W. 
Purvis "for the term of twelve months from the 3rd 
day of September, 1928, from Noon Standard Time" 
against loss or disability or death from accidental 
means. On September 3, 1929, about five o'clock in 
the afternoon Purvis was fatally injured. The Court 
held that the policy had lapsed at the time of the in-
jury and stated as follows : 
"In the case at bar, the parties stipulated in 
the contract, as was their right, that the insur-
ance should be for a term of twelve months, be-
ginning at noon of September 3, 1928; in view 
of the fact that the insured was fatally injured 
a few hours after noon on September 3, 1929, 
it would be an injustice to the insurer for the 
court to hold, nothing else appearing, that the 
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insurance was in force during the whole of that 
day." 
The Plaintiff contended that a receipt book 
issued by the company contained a notation that 
the premium must be paid on or before September 
3, 1929, and that by reason of there being no limi-
tations as to time of day when the premium should 
be paid that the insured had the entire day to make 
payment thereof. In discussing this point, however, 
the Court said : 
"The receipt book contains notice that such 
premium must be paid on or before September 
3, 1929. The policy indicates that it was the 
clear intent of the parties that the insurance 
should expire at 12 o'clock noon September 3, 
1929. There is nothing in the receipt book to 
indicate a contrary intention; the notice that 
the renewal premium must be paid on or before 
September 3, 1929, merely meaning, in connec-
tion with the provisions of the policy, that, if 
payment should be deferred until that date, it 
must be made by 12 o'clock noon. It being con-
ceded that the renewal premium, was not paid 
by or before 12 o'clock noon of September 3, 
and that the insured received his injuries some 
hours thereafter, it is clear that the policy was 
not in force at the time of the fatal accident." 
The Court will recall this case was before it 
on a prior appeal in which the judgment of the trial 
Court was vacated and the case remanded for 
further proceedings. Cooper, vs. Foresters Under-
writers, Inc., ------------------------------------------Utah __________________________________________ , 
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257 Pac. 2d 540. The present and former judgments 
entered by the trial Court were apparently based 
on the theory that the grace period did not expire 
until midnight on October 31, 1951. Appellant con-
tends that by vacating the former judgment this 
Court rejected the theory of the trial Court and that 
the judgment now appealed from should be vacated 
for the same reason. Except the ruling of this Court 
in the prior appeal of this case, our search has not 
revealed a Utah case exactly in point on the facts. 
However, Fawcett, vs. Security Benefit Association, 
99 Utah 193, 104 Pac. 2d 214,' 218, is a case involv-
ing the construction of an insurance con tract and 
the principle of construction therein adopted is de-
terminative of the question involved in the .case at 
bar. The language of the Court is : 
"Since such provision of the certificate is not 
so clear as to be susceptible of but one construc-
tion, we must determine which of the permis-
sible interpretations thereof is consistent with 
the other provisions of the entire agreement. 
Even though a particular provision of a con-
tract of insurance be susceptible of more than 
one meaning, the construction of such provision 
more favorable to the assured will not be 
adopted if other provisions of the entire contract 
clearly resolve the ambiguity in favor of the 
contrary construction." 
There is no ambiguity in the con tract in the 
case at bar. The trial court went beyond and out-
side the contract and adopted a legal fiction con-
trary to its terms. The contract can not be rendered 
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ambiguous by a strained misapplication of a legal 
fiction. In the Fawcett case, where the contract 
itself was susceptible of more than one meaning, 
this Court adopted the interpretation consistent with 
the other provisions of the entire contract. In the 
case at bar, where an alternative interpretation is 
made possible only by a legal fiction, this Court is 
bound to follow the holding in the Fawcett case and 
adopt the interpretation which is consistent with 
the entire provisions of the contract. 
The Argument thus far has been based upon 
the provisions of the Certificate only. Appellant's 
position is well founded upon the provisions of the 
Certificate without resort to the By-Laws. However, 
the following provision of the By-Laws supports 
Appellant's contention: 
"1. A member enrolling for membership, re-
gardless of the time of day that the application 
is made, his coverage shall start as of the time 
payment is received but shall be dated as of 
12 :00 o'clock noon the date premium is received 
and for said premiu1ns received his coverage 
would continue in force for one month from 
that date and in addition would have a 31-day 
grace period at which time, if no other pre-
miums were received, his membership would 
terminate at 12 :00 o'clock noon of the 31st day 
of grace." 
Respondent will probably urge that the By-
Laws are not a part of the contract, for the reason 
that no reference to them was made in the Certifi-
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cate. Section 31-29-8, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
provides in part as follows : 
"The certificate, together with any riders or 
endorsements attached thereto, the charter, the 
constitution and laws of the society, the appli-
cation for membership, and declaration of in-
surability, if any, signed by the applicant, and 
all amendments to each thereof, shall constitute 
the agreement between the society and the mem-
ber, and the certificate shall so state. 
It would seem that where the statute specifically 
makes the By-Laws a part of the contract that such 
is conclusive regardless of whether the Certificate 
so states or not. We have found no case holding to 
the contrary. 
IV 
THE RIGHT OF FORFEITURE WAS NOT 
WAIVED. 
The judgment of the trial Court is not based 
upon a waiver. There was no finding of waiver. 
However, it is anticipated Respondent will claim 
there has been a waiver and will rely upon the 
following circumstances in support of her claim 
of waiver: The first premium was paid in the 
afternoon of March 31, 1951, and coverage started 
at noon of that day; that the payments on Oc-
tober 1, 1951, a11d October 31, 1951, were ac-
cepted unconditionally ; that the payments on Oc-
tober 1, 1951, and October 31, 1951, were made 
in the afternoon of those days, after the grace period 
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had expired; that Appellant never tendered back 
to Respondent any premiums. No waiver exists by 
reason of such circumstances. 
The policy became effective on March 31, 1951, 
at noon. That the premium was paid and the policy 
issued later that day is of no consequence. Had the 
policy been dated the following day Respondent 
would not have been covered by insurance until 
Noon of the following day. Undoubtedly it was to 
the advantage of Respondent to have immediate cov-
erage and that is why the policy was dated on the 
date of the payment of the premium. No inter-
ference arises from this incident that a pattern of 
accepting premiums late was established. 
The premium on October 1, 1951, was paid in 
the afternoon of said day. Whether paid in the fore-
noon or afternoon, makes no difference. If paid in 
the forenoon Appellant was obligated to accept the 
premium as the grace period had not expired. If 
it was paid in the afternoon Appellant had the legal 
right to accept the payment and apply it to the Sep-
tember coverage. Respondent enjoyed coverage dur-
ing the month of September, which Appellant was 
entitled to be compensated for. The authorities hold 
that even in the event of forfeiture the insured is 
not relieved of the obligation to pay for the period 
the policy is in force. 44 C. J. S. 1331, Mass. Union 
Mut. Casualty Ins. Corporation, vs. Insurance Bud-
get Plan, 195 N. E. 903, 291 Mass. 62, 98 A. L~ R. 
1422. Mo.-General Service Corporation vs. Allhoff 
Bros., App., 139 S. W. 2d 1062. Neb.-Bleicher v. 
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Heeter 4 N. W. 2d 897, 141 Neb. 787. N. Y. Great 
American Indemnity Co., v. Greenberg Bros. Iron 
& Steel Corporation, 10 N. Y. S. 2d 656, 170 Misc. 
489 - Commercial Casualty Co. v. Rice, 157 N. Y. S. 
1, 93 Misc. 567. 
The payment of $12.00 on October 31, 1951, 
Vilas made in the afternoon of said day, but after the 
accident had occurred. Appellant applied $6.00 of 
that amount to the October coverage and the remain-
ing $6.00 was used to reinstate the policy. How-
ever, the policy could be reinstated only according 
to its terms: 
"REINSTATEMENT. The right of the in-
sured to have the policy reinstated after de-
fault in the payment of a premium, and his 
rights under the policy as reinstateed, are de-
terminted by the provisions of the policy." 45 
C. J. S. Page 558. 
The only limitation on reinstatement was that 
is covered accidental injury thereafter sustained. 
The policy does not require a new application 
or evidence of insurability in order to effect a rein-
statement. No reason existed to alter the date of 
covrage if reinstatement occurred on the last day 
of the month which had always been the date de-
termining monthly coverage. The policy having been 
reinstated there was no occasion to tender back any 
premiums to Respondent. 
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The cases heretofore relied upon by Respondent 
to establish waiver have no application to the case 
at bar. 
In Ellerbeck, vs. Continental Casualty Com-
pany, 63 Utah 530, 227 Pac. 850, the insurance 
company had forwarded statements to the insured 
demanding payment of the annual premium. There 
had been a conversation between a representative 
of the insurance company and the insured wherein 
a credit arrangement had been granted by the com-
pany to the insured and the company had accepted 
a partial payment of the premium for the period in 
question. 
In Loftis, vs. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance 
Company, 38 Utah 532, 114 Pac. 134, arrangements 
had been made with the employer of the insured to 
deduct premiums from his wages. The insurance 
company submitted a list to the employer containing 
the names of policy holders and the amount of pre-
miums owing for the months involved. It was made 
to appear that the insurance company knew other 
employees who had not earned sufficient wages each 
month to pay insurance premiums promptly when 
due. Several instances of default of payment had 
occurred, which the insurance corn pany had dis-
regarded. The corn pany had demanded and received 
payment of premium and treated them as though 
they had been timely paid. 
In Vinther, vs. Sunset Mutual Life Insurance 
Company, 53 Pac. 182 (Cal.) it was made to ap-
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pear that ten payments had been made late and 
accepted by the company, one of which was as much 
as 38 days late. 
In Sullivan vs. Beneficial Life Insurance Com-
pany, 91 Utah 405, 64 Pac. 2d 351, the wife of the 
insured was told before the expiration of the grace 
period by a representative of the company that 
"When Mr. Sullivan sends the money to you, bring it 
in." She was also told it would be all right to bring 
it in after the grace period expired, and was also 
advised that in case the money does not arrive for 
some time she could take an application for rein-
statement form and have Mr. Sullivan fill it out 
and bring it in when he returned home. 
In Watkins, vs. Brotherhood of America Y oe-
men (Mo.) 176 S. W. 516, it was made to appear 
that it was the practice of the company to permit 
payments to be made after the due date in 80% 
to 90% of the cases and in such instances to rein-
state the policy. 
In Bonnot, vs. Grand Lodge Brotherhood of 
R. R. Trainmen (Mo.) 81 S. W. 2d 360, the Court 
found the company had waived a forfeiture where 
it was shown the Treasurer of its local lodges had 
been permitted to accept premiums late. 
In Knarston, vs. Manhattan Life Insurance 
Company (Cal.) 56 Pac. 773, it was made to ap-
pear that a general agent had granted a ten day 
extension and had attempted to collect the premium 
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on two occasions after the ten days had elapsed and 
the general agent had testified that he would have 
accepted the premium had it been tendered to him 
on the date of the death of the insured. 
In Huber, vs. New York Life Insurance Com-
pany (Cal.) 63 Pac. 2d 318, it was held that the 
company was estopped under the circumstances to 
deny that an agent to whom payment had been 
made within the time allowed by the policy had 
authority to collect the premium. 
The test of waiver is stated by this Court in 
Ballard, vs. Beneficial Life Insurance Company, 82 
Utah 1, 21 Pac. 2d 84 7, as follows: 
"Insurance company which, by any course of 
conduct, induces in mind of insured honest be-
lief, reasonably founded, that strict compliance 
with stipulation for prompt payment of pre-
miums will not be insisted on, waives right to 
forfeiture for nonpayment." 
According to this test none of the element~ of 
waiver exists in the case at bar. No "course of 
conduct" was "reasonably founded" which could 
have induced in the mind of Respondent an honest 
belief that strict compliance would not be insisted 
upon. There is no question but what all payments 
prior to October 1st had been made within the grace 
period. Although the October 1st payment was made 
in the afternoon of that day such does not establish 
a "course of conduct" upon which waiver can be 
predicated. None of the above cases so hold, and 
such is not the law. 
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The following provision of the By-Laws sus-
tains Appellant's position with regard to waiver: 
"If a member shall have lapsed it is con-
sidered that he must pay all back premiums 
in order to reinstate and the due date shall 
remain the same as originally stated in his 
membership certificate and he will be penalized 
not only the payment of back premiums but 
his coverage shall become effective for accident 
only from the time reinstatement premiums 
was received and all other coverage shall com-
mence 10 days thereafter. 
CONCLUSION 
The amount involved in this case is small. It 
would have been far less expensive for Appellant 
to have paid Respondent's claim. The Court will 
appreciate that in denying Respondent's claim Ap-
pellant bears no ill will toward Respondent and is 
not trying to avoid its legal obligations, but con-
tends that according to law Respondent was not 
covered by the policy of insurance in connection with 
the claim herein sued upon. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROMNEY AND BOYER 
Attorneys for Appellant 
1409 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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